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In the twenty-first century, copyright protection is automatic. It vests in
eligible works the instant that those works are first embodied in a tangible
format.' Many Americans are unaware of that, believing instead that
registration and copyright notice are required to secure a copyright. 2 That
impression is understandable. For its first 199 years, United States copyright
law required authors to take affirmative steps to obtain copyright protection.
The first U.S. copyright statute, enacted by Congress in 1790, required the
eligible author of an eligible work 3 to record the title of the work with the clerk
of the court in the author's local district, deposit a copy of the printed title with
the clerk's office, cause a copy of the registration record to be printed for four
weeks running in a newspaper, and deliver a copy of the published work to the

* John F. Nickoll Professor of Law and Professor of Information, University of
Michigan. I'd like to thank Wendy Gordon and Stacey Dogan for persuading me to think
about these questions, and Jane Ginsburg, Laura Harlow, and Jon Weinberg for extremely
useful comments on an earlier draft.
1 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 201(a) (2012).
2 When I presented an early version of this project at a faculty lunch, I began by
explaining that while copyright protection is now automatic, U.S. law used to require
publication, notice, and registration in order to secure a copyright. My colleagues, brilliant
lawyers all and most of them too young to have run into copyright law before 1976,
expressed great surprise that copyright protection no longer required publication, notice, or
registration.
' Copyright protection under the 1790 Act was limited to maps, charts, and books
authored by U.S. citizens or residents. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124
(repealed 1831).
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Secretary of State. 4 Twelve years later, Congress added an additional
requirement: copyright owners must place a prescribed copyright notice on
every copy of a copyrighted work. 5 In 1909, Congress eliminated the
registration and deposit prerequisites for protection,6 but retained until 1978
the requirement that accurate copyright notice appear on every copy of a
work. 7 For 176 years of United States copyright history, then, accurate
8
copyright notice was essential to securing a copyright in almost all works.
Publishing copies of a work without copyright notice, or with the wrong name
9
in the notice, was fatal to copyright protection.
Scholarly commentary on copyright notice has tended to tell two conflicting
stories. In the first story, the notice prerequisite was confiscatory, serving
primarily to divest deserving authors of the protection they earned through

4 Id. §§ 2-4.

1 Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 1, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (repealed 1831). Notice under the
1802 Act duplicated the language of the copyright registration record: "Entered according to
act of Congress the [date] day of [month] [year] by [name of author or proprietor] of
[state]." Id.
6 See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 12, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078 (repealed 1976) [hereinafter
1909 Act].
7 In 1976, Congress extended automatic copyright protection to any work upon its
fixation in tangible form. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102, 90 Stat.
2541, 2544-45 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-810) [hereinafter 1976 Act]. It retained the
requirement of copyright notice in order to preserve copyright protection, but eliminated the
responsibility to ensure that the copyright notice was accurate. See id. §§ 401-402, 404-406.
In 1988, Congress eliminated the notice requirement entirely for works that had not been
published as of the effective date of the Act. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102 Stat. 2853, 2857-59 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.).
8 See, e.g., VINCENT A. DOYLE, GEORGE D. CARY, MARJORIE MCCANNON & BARBARA A.
RINGER, STUDY No. 7: NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT, in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDY No. 7, at 5 (Comm. Print 1960) [hereinafter
STUDY No. 7: NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT] (footnote omitted):
Among the basic conditions for protection provided in the U.S. copyright law,
perhaps the most important is the requirement for a copyright notice. To secure and
maintain copyright in the United States, the copies of a work published in this country
must bear a notice in the form and position specified in the statute. Publication of a
work without the prescribed notice results in the permanent loss of copyright protection
and places the work in the public domain.
The 1909 Act permitted copyrights in unpublished lectures, plays, musical compositions,
photographs, and paintings to be secured through registration rather than publication with
notice. 1909 Act § 11. If copies of those works were later distributed to the public, though,
each copy needed a correct copyright notice. Id.
I See, e.g., Mifflin v. R.H. White Co. (Mifflin I1), 190 U.S. 260, 264 (1903). The rules
concerning copyright notices bearing the wrong date depended on the statutory class of the
work and whether the date was later or earlier than the actual date of first publication. See
STUDY No. 7: NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT, supra note 8, at 19-21.
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their creativity. 10 In the second story, conditioning copyright protection on the
presence of accurate copyright notice helped to assure that copyright protection
attached to works whose owners valued copyright, protection while leaving
other potentially copyrighted material in the public domain." Requiring
copyright notice, thus, allowed United States law to tolerate a broader range of
potentially copyrightable subject matter and a lower threshold for originality
than other countries found workable. 12 Copyright notice, further, enabled
members of the public to ascertain whether copyright protection subsisted in a
work and, if so, who owned it. 13 I am more sympathetic to the second story
than the first, 14 but here I want to pursue a different question. In this article, I
explore the effect of the notice prerequisite on the law's treatment of copyright
ownership.
My reading of the cases has persuaded me that the notice prerequisite, as
construed by the courts, encouraged the development of legal doctrines
surrounding ownership that herded the ownership of copyrights into the hands
of publishers and other intermediaries, notwithstanding statutory provisions
that seem to have been designed at least in part to enable authors to keep their
copyrights. I don't mean to suggest that anyone adopted a notice prerequisite
with this purpose; I think the purpose of copyright notice was always
understood as protecting members of the public by informing them that a copy
15
embodied a work protected by copyright, and telling them who controlled it.
Nonetheless, with hindsight, it's easy to see that a strictly construed notice
requirement had the effect of liberating many copyrights from their authors for
the benefit of the works' publishers. Notice also allowed the law to tolerate

10See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, "With Untired Spirits and Formal Constancy": Berne
Compatibility of Formal DeclaratoryMeasures to Enhance Copyright Title-Searching, 28
BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1583, 1584-85 (2013).

11See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REv. 485,
502-19 (2004).
12 See id.
13 See, e.g., Daniel Gervais & Dashiell Renaud, The Future of United States Copyright
Formalities:Why We Should PrioritizeRecordation and How to Do It, 28 BERKELEY TECH.
LJ. 1459, 1460-61 (2013).
14 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 1417, 20-22 (2004).
15 See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 294-95 (1907); Mifflin III,
190 U.S. 260, 264 (1903); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487,
489-90 (2d Cir. 1960); Osgood v. A.S. Aloe Instrument Co., 83 F. 470, 472-73 (C.C.E.D.
Mo. 1897); Smith v. Wilkinson, 19 F. Supp. 841, 842 (D.N.H. 1937). But see Rosenbach v.
Dreyfuss, 2 F. 217, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1880) ("The purpose of [a provision penalizing false
copyright notice] seems to be to protect persons entitled to copyrights from their privilege
being impaired, cheapened, and lessened in value by the unauthorized assumption of the
privilege by persons not entitled thereto.").
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completely and unpredictably alienable copyrights, since prospective licensees
16
could always find out who the copyright owner was by looking at the notice.
Copyright commentary tends to describe the alienable property
characteristics of American copyright as reflecting the United States's
fundamentally utilitarian approach to copyright. 17 Maybe. Alternatively,
perhaps the promiscuous alienability of U.S. copyrights is an accidental
development that derived from courts' constructions of the copyright notice
provision. It appears in any event that some aspects of copyright's alienability
reflect a story of path dependence. Because copyright law required notice,
other doctrinal developments were shaped by and distorted by that
requirement.
In 1989, we abandoned any reliance on copyright notice.1 8 We did not,
though, think about ways to retrofit our law to replace the supports that notice
provided for its underlying assumptions. The distortions that notice encouraged
continue to shape case law adjudicating ownership of U.S. copyrights, despite
19
the fact that they no longer make practical or legal sense.
I. BACKGROUND
Let's start with a brief and summary chronology: during the eighteenth
century, crown printing privileges evolved into statutory copyright. 20 In
England, Parliament enacted the Statute of Anne, which made exclusive
printing privileges available to the authors of published books and their
assigns, on registration of the title with the Stationer's Company. 21 The statute
defined infringement as the act of printing, reprinting, or importing a registered
book or causing a book to be printed, reprinted, or imported, "without the
Consent of the Proprietor or Proprietors thereof first had and obtained in

e.g., Am. Tobacco Co., 207 U.S. at 293-94. In today's post-notice realm, it is
difficult and often impossible to discover the identity of the owners of the copyright in a
16 See,

work. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION: A REPORT OF

THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 2, 9-11, 35-37 (2015). The adoption of unconstrained
divisibility of copyright, which allows any splinter of an exclusive right to be separately
owned and conveyed, has greatly aggravated the problem. See infra notes 132, 139-45 and
accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author
Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZo ARTS & ENT. LJ.
1,9-13 (1994).
18See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102
Stat. 2853, 2857-59 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
19 See, e.g., 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 256-61 (2d Cir. 2015); Marvel
Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F. 3d 119,136-44 (2d Cir. 2013).
20 See generally ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 17-40 (2010).
21 Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19. The statute also obliged the author or assign to
deposit copies for the use of libraries.
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Writing, Signed in the Presence of Two or more Credible Witnesses ....,,22
British courts would construe that language to require that any copyright
assignment, before or after publication, be in writing. 23 Publishers who could
not produce a written assignment of the author's copyright were deemed to
own no copyright in the works they claimed .24
In 1790, the United States enacted its first federal copyright act, enabling
authors of published books, maps, or charts, who were U.S. citizens or
residents to secure the sole right to print, reprint, publish, and vend the work by
recording the title of the work and depositing a printed copy of the title in the
office of the clerk of the district court before publication, causing a copy of the
record to be published in a newspaper, and delivering a copy of the published
work to the Secretary of State within six months of publication. 25 The
American statute defined infringement in language imported from the Statute
of Anne, as encompassing printing, reprinting, publishing, or importing any
copy or copies "without the consent of the author or proprietor thereof, first
had and obtained in writing, signed in the presence of two or more credible
witnesses. '' 26 That language would remain in United States copyright statutes
27
through several major revisions, finally disappearing in 1909.28
In 1802, Congress added a requirement that the author or proprietor insert a
notice of copyright on the title page of any book or the face of any map or
chart. 29 The requirement made particular sense in a market in which the vast
majority of published books, maps, and charts were unprotected by
copyright. 30 The question whether the statutory provisions imposed strict
preconditions to copyright protection or simply mandated obligations that
might be excused came before a federal court in 1824 in the case of Ewer v.
22 Id. Parliament repealed the two-witness requirement in 1814. See Copyright Act 1814,
54 Geo. 3 c. 156, § 4; Cumberland v. Copeland (1862) 158 Eng. Rep. 856, 856.
23 E.g., Power v. Walker (1814) 171 Eng. Rep. 3, 3-4; see also PETER BURKE, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 19-21 (1842).

24 E.g., Clementi v. Walker (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 601,603 (alternate ground).
21 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, §§ 1,3-4, 1 Stat. 124,124-25 (repealed 1831).
26 Id. § 2.

27 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 6-7, 4 Stat. 436, 437-38 (repealed 1870); Rev.
Stat. §§ 4964-65 (1875).
28 1909 Act, ch. 320, § 42, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (repealed 1976).
29 Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 1, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (repealed 1831). The Act also
extended copyright protection to etchings and prints. Id. § 2.
30 In 1987, historian James Gilreath reported that of 15,000 publications between 1790
and 1800, researchers were able to find only 779 copyright registrations for the period.
JAMES GILREATH, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS 1790-1800 ix (1987). Since works by

foreign authors were categorically ineligible for copyright, it isn't surprising that a small
proportion of published works availed themselves of copyright protection. Bill Patry asserts
that another and perhaps more important reason for the small number of copyrighted books
was that publishers found the registration and deposit requirements too burdensome. See 1
WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1.19 (2015).
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Coxe.31 Charles Ewer, the publisher of the Pharmacopoeiaof the United States
of America, filed suit to enjoin the publication of a competing drug reference
book, claiming that it infringed his copyright. Ewer had registered the title of
the book, and had printed a copyright notice on the page after the title page of
every copy of the book, but had failed to publish a copy of the registration
record in any newspaper. The court held that Ewer had failed to secure a
copyright in the Pharmacopoeia.2 The language of the 1802 Act, the court
concluded, admitted of no other construction than that all four requirementsregistration and deposit of a printed copy with the court clerk, newspaper
publication of the record, transmission of a copy of the published work to the
Secretary of State, and printing the copyright notice-were strict prerequisites
to copyright protection .33
In 1831, Congress enacted the first general revision of copyright law. 34 The
revision act extended copyright to musical compositions and extended the
copyright term. It retained the registration, deposit, and notice requirements,
though, and continued to define infringement as printing or publishing a work
without having secured the written consent of the copyright owner in the
presence of two witnesses. 35 In 1834, Congress amended the copyright act to
provide for the recordation of copyright assignments.36

31

32

8 F. Cas. 917 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1824).
Id. at 920.

33 Id. at 919.

Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 6-7, 4 Stat. 436,437-38 (repealed 1870).
31 Id.§§ 1,6-7,9.
36 Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 157, § 1,4 Stat. 728, 728 (repealed 1870):
That all deeds or instruments in writing for the transfer or assignment of copyrights,
being proved and acknowledged in such manner as deeds for the conveyance of land
are required by law to be proved or acknowledged in the same state or district, shall
and may be recorded in the office where the original copyright is deposited and
14

recorded ....

In 1870, Congress enacted another general revision of copyright. Act of July 8, 1870, ch.
230, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed 1909). Section 89 of the Act provided:
That copyrights shall be assignable in law, by any instrument of writing, and such
assignment shall be recorded in the office of the librarian of Congress within sixty days
after its execution, in default of which it shall be void as against any subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice.
In Fred FisherMusic Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943), the Supreme Court
predicated its conclusion that renewal terms were assignable on a comparison between the
copyright office records of renewal term assignments before and after the enactment of the
1909 Act. Id. at 657-58. This was appropriate, the Court said, because "[s]ince the
enactment of the Copyright Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 198, 213, assignments of copyrights must
be recorded in the office of the Register of Copyrights." Id. at 658. Lower courts before and
after this case, however, construed the recordation requirement to permit enforcement of
unrecorded assigned copyrights unless infringers were bona fide purchasers without notice.
E.g., New Fiction Publ'g Co. v. Star Co., 220 F. 994, 995-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); Photo Drama
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Henry Wheaton was the reporter for Supreme Court decisions from 1816 to
1827. When his successor, Richard Peters, announced that he would be
republishing the judicial decisions that Wheaton had reported, Wheaton sued
for copyright infringement. Peters argued that Wheaton had failed to secure a
copyright on his reports, because he had neglected to deliver copies of the
volumes to the Secretary of State. Wheaton insisted that even if he had failed
to comply scrupulously with the copyright statute's requirements, he was
entitled to an injunction on the basis of a common law copyright, arising from
natural law. 37 The Supreme Court rejected the principle that authors had a
perpetual common law copyright, holding that copyrights in published work
were available only as a matter of statutory law. Any common law rights in an
unpublished manuscript did not survive its publication.
That an author, at common law, has a property in his manuscript, and
may obtain redress against any one who deprives him of it, or by
improperly obtaining a copy endeavours to realise a profit by its
publication, cannot be doubted; but this is a very different right from that
which asserts a perpetual and exclusive property in the future publication
38
of the work, after the author shall have published it to the world.
The Court construed the copyright laws to require strict compliance with all of
39
the statutory conditions as a prerequisite to federal copyright protection.
The acts required to be done by an author, to secure his right, are in
the order in which they must naturally transpire. First, the title of the book
is to be deposited with the clerk, and the record he makes must be
inserted in the first or second page; then the public notice in the
newspapers is to be given; and within six months after the publication of
40
the book, a copy must be deposited in the department of state.

Motion Picture Co. v. Social Uplift Film Corp., 213 F. 374, 376-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), affd,
220 F. 448 (2d Cir. 1915).
37 See generally Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright
Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REv. 1119, 1178-87
(1983); Craig Joyce, The Story of Wheaton v. Peters: A Curious Chapter in the History of
Judicature, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 36 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
38 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 657 (1834). It's unclear from a twenty-first century
vantage point whether the Court's reference to a common law "property in his manuscript"
refers to the author's ownership of the tangible copy embodied in the manuscript or to
literary property in the manuscript's contents. See, e.g., Wendy Gordon, The Core of
Copyright: Authors, Not Publishers, 52 Hous. L. REv. 613, 620-21 n.15 (2014); Ronan
Deazley, Capitol Records v. Naxos of America (2005): Just Another Footnote in the History
of Copyright?, 53 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 23, 62-63 (2005).
39 Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 665-68; see also, e.g., Baker v. Taylor, 2 F. Cas. 478, 478-79
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1848) (holding the copyright invalid because of a failure to print the correct
date in the copyright notice).
40 Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 664.
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The Court remanded the case to the lower court to permit a jury to determine
whether Henry Wheaton or his publisher had in fact complied with all of the
statutory conditions.41
II.

NINETEENTH CENTURY ASSIGNMENTS OF COPYRIGHT... AND OTHER
TRANSFERS

By the middle of the nineteenth century, then, the federal copyright statute
afforded copyright only to published works.42 It required deposit before
publication of a printed copy of the work's title with the clerk of the local
district court, printing of copyright notice on the title page or the page
following the title page, and delivery of a copy of the published work within
three months to the clerk of the court, who was commanded to send it on to the
Secretary of State. 43 U.S. courts had concluded that copyright protection was
available only after careful compliance with the statutory conditions. 44 The
statute also commanded that copyright assignments be recorded.4 5 It contained
language that had been read by British courts to invalidate any assignment of
copyright in a published or unpublished work unless that assignment were in
writing. 46 Did the requirement for strict compliance with statutory terms apply
either to the provision requiring copyright assignments and licenses to be in
writing, or to the command that written assignments "shall and may" be
recorded? Mid-nineteenth century copyright experts were unsure.
In 1847, Boston lawyer George Ticknor Curtis published his Treatise on the
Law of Copyright.4 7 Curtis characterized the question whether unwritten

41 Id. at 667-68. The majority opinion also noted in passing that all of the Justices were
"unanimously of opinion, that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written
opinions delivered by this court; and that the judges thereof cannot confer on any reporter
any such right." Id. at 668.
42 Although the meaning of the term "publication" was contested, the weight of authority
defined it as the distribution of copies of a work to the public. See WILLIAM S. STRAUSS,
STUDY No. 29: PROTECTION OF UNPUBLISHED WORKS, in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES Nos. 29-31, at 5-15 (Comm.

Print 1961). In 1976, Congress added a definition of "publication" to the copyright statute.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
4' Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 4-5, 4 Stat. 436, 437 (repealed 1870).
44 E.g., Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 665; Baker, 2 F. Cas. at 479; Ewer v. Coxe, 8 F. Cas. 917

(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1824).
45 Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 157, § 1,4 Stat. 728,728 (repealed 1870).

Act of Feb. 3, 1831 §§ 7, 9. See, e.g., Clementi v. Walker (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 601,
603; Power v. Walker (1814) 171 Eng. Rep. 3, 3.
46

47 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS,

DRAMATIC AND MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS, LETTERS AND OTHER MANUSCRIPTS, ENGRAVINGS
AND SCULPTURE, AS ENACTED AND ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1847).
Curtis's treatise is commonly described as the first American treatise on copyright law. See,
e.g., Oren Bracha, Commentary on George Ticknor Curtis'sTreatise on the Law of
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copyright assignments were void as "a point admitting of great doubt. '48 Curtis
noted that British cases had read similar statutory language to permit only
written assignments of copyright in published or unpublished works. 49 The
1834 amendment to the U.S. copyright law, Curtis wrote, "seems to recognize
the doctrine, that transfers or [sic] copyright must be in writing, but it does not
'50
expressly declare that they shall be so."
Five years later, that question arose in the case of Pulte v. Derby.5 1 Dr. Pulte
signed an agreement to give publisher H.W. Derby & Company "the exclusive
right to print and publish an edition of one thousand copies" of a book to be
written by Pulte titled Homoeopathic Domestic Physician,52 in return for a
royalty of 15¢ per copy sold. The agreement gave Derby the option to print a
second edition in return for a royalty of 20¢ per copy. After the success of the
second edition, the publisher sought to publish another edition. Dr. Pulte
objected that he had not authorized any editions beyond the second printing
and sued to enjoin Derby from infringing his copyright. Derby countersued,
insisting that it owned the copyright and seeking an injunction to prevent Dr.
53
Pulte from publishing his own edition of the book.
The Circuit Court for the District of Ohio concluded that the written
agreement did not itself convey Dr. Pulte's copyright to Derby because Dr.
Pulte did not yet have a copyright at the time he signed the agreement:
The agreement between the parties does not purport to convey the
copyright. At the time it was entered into no copyright had been secured;
and there is no provision in the agreement, by whom it was to be acquired
in future. The contract embraced only the printing and publication of the
work, on the terms stated. It gave the defendants the exclusive right to
print and publish an edition of one thousand copies; and should a second
edition be called for, the complainant was to revise and correct the first
one, and the defendants were to prepare stereotype plates, and to print as
many copies, on the terms stated, as "they can sell." We must look out of
the contract, to the acts of the parties, in regard to the copyright. And
these facts must, necessarily, have a strong bearing upon the contract. It
will tend to show how it was understood and construed by the parties to
it. It may be observed that in making a mere contract for printing and
publishing a work, it is not usual to say any thing about the copyright.
Copyright (1847), in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900) (L. Bently & M.

Kretschmer eds., 2008), www.copyrighthistory.org [https://perma.cc/FE9W-7WWU].
48 CURTIS, supra note 47, at 220.
'9

Id. at 220-24; see, e.g., Clementi v. Walker (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 601,603.

50 CURTIS, supra note 47, at 233.

51 20 F. Cas. 51 (C.C.D. Ohio 1852).
52 J.H. PULTE, HOMOEOPATHIC DOMESTIC PHYSICIAN; CONTAINING THE TREATMENT OF
DISEASES,

WITH POPULAR EXPLANATIONS ON ANATOMY,

(1850).
13 Pulte, 20 F. Cas. at 51.

HYDROPATHY

PHYSIOLOGY, HYGIENE,
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That is ordinarily retained by the author, unless there be an agreement or
understanding, that the name of the publisher shall be used for that
purpose. We must then look at the book itself, and to the appropriate
records, to see in whom the copyright is vested. The evidence of this right
must appear on the second page of the book published, it must be entered
in the records of the clerk of the district court of the United States, and
one of the copies must be deposited in the department of state of the
United States, the Smithsonian Institute, and the Congressional Library.
Until these things are done, the copyright is not perfect; although, by
taking the incipient step, a right is acquired, which chancery will protect,
until the other acts may be done .4
Looking outside the contract to the acts of the parties, the court concluded
that Dr. Pulte had in fact authorized Derby to secure the copyright on its own
behalf:
When the agreement was entered into, the complainant had no
copyright to convey.... It was the interest of both parties to have the
copyright secured. Without this, the first publication of it would have
abandoned it to the public, and consequently, it could have been of no
more value to either party than to any other publishers or authors, who
might choose to revise and republish it. The defendants, it appears,
secured to themselves the copyright. And the evidence of that right was
published on the second page of the book, which was under the eye of the
55
complainant. He, therefore, sanctioned it.
Since the notice and certificate of registration were in the name of the
publisher, the court reasoned, the publisher must be the owner of the
copyright. 5 6 The author's failure to assign his copyright in writing didn't
undermine the validity of the transfer because, at the time of the agreement, he
57
had not yet secured federal statutory copyright protection.
Henry Wheaton, in addition to being the Supreme Court reporter at the
58
center of Wheaton v. Peters, authored an influential international law treatise.
After Wheaton's death in 1848, his widow, Catherine Wheaton, consulted her
late husband's friend, W.B. Lawrence, who had done some work for Wheaton
54 Id. at 51-52.
" Id. at 52. The court concluded that the action arose under a contract rather than the
copyright law and that the federal court therefore lacked jurisdiction to enter an injunction
against either party. It recommended, however, that the author agree to revise and improve
the manuscript, in return for which the publisher would pay the author a more generous
royalty for subsequent editions. Id. at 53.
56 Id. at 52.

57 Id.
58 HENRY WHEATON,

ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH A SKETCH OF THE

HISTORY OF SCIENCE (Carey, Lea & Blanchard 1836). The copyright was registered in the
publisher's name, and the notice accordingly named the publisher. Wheaton published three
revised editions before his death in 1848.
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on a revised edition of the treatise. Catherine asked Lawrence to edit a new
edition of the treatise, which he agreed to do. Lawrence updated and annotated
the treatise. It was published in 1855 by Little, Brown as Elements of
International Law by Henry Wheaton, Sixth Edition by William Beach
Lawrence. 59 Little, Brown registered the copyright in the sixth edition in
Catherine's name and put her name in the copyright notice. 60 At Catherine's
request, Lawrence edited a seventh edition, published in 1863, and copyrighted
61
in Catherine's name.
In 1866 Catherine died. Her daughter, Martha Wheaton, was dissatisfied
with Lawrence's work, and she and Little, Brown engaged Richard Henry
Dana, Jr., to prepare an eighth edition of the treatise. 62 Lawrence filed suit for
copyright infringement. 63 He alleged that he had agreed to furnish his services
for no pay on the understanding that while Catherine would hold the formal
title to the copyright and would be paid all of the proceeds of the revised
editions, she would not use his additions and annotations without his written
consent. Catherine, moreover, had authorized Lawrence to reuse his
contributions in any way that he wished. Although Dana denied having
incorporated any of Lawrence's contributions into his edition, Lawrence
identified multiple incidents of copying. 64 Dana argued that the copyrights on
Lawrence's two editions of Wheaton were void, because Lawrence never
assigned his copyright in writing to Catherine, and thus registration and notice
had been made in the name of the wrong person .65
The court concluded that because Lawrence wished to render his services to
Catherine at no charge, so that she could profit from further editions of her late
husband's treatise, Lawrence's contributions vested in Catherine as an initial
matter:
Although the services were gratuitous, the contributions of the
complainant became the property of the proprietor of the book, as the
work was done, just as effectually as they would if the complainant had
been paid daily an agreed price for his labor. He gave the contributions to

59 HENRY WHEATON & WILLIAM BEACH LAWRENCE, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

(Little, Brown & Co. 6th ed. 1855).
60 See id. at the page following the title page.
61 HENRY WHEATON & WILLIAM BEACH LAWRENCE, LAWRENCE'S WHEATON: ELEMENTS

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Little, Brown & Co. 2d ann. ed. 1863). The page after the title
page included two copyright notices in Catherine's name: one for the 1855 edition and the
second for the 1863 edition.
62 See HENRY WHEATON & RICHARD HENRY DANA, JR., ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW (Little, Brown & Co. 8th ann. ed. 1866). The page following the title page of the 8th
edition contained three copyright notices: the 1855 and 1863 notices in Catherine's name,
and an 1866 notice in Martha's name.
63 Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 29 (C.C.D. Mass 1869).
64 See id. at 52-63.
65 See id. at 50.
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the proprietor for those two editions of the work, and the title to the same
vested in the proprietor, as the work was done, to the extent of the gift,
and subject to the trust in favor of the donor, as necessarily implied by the
terms of the arrangement.... The title and property of the contributions
being vested in Mrs. Wheaton, she would not acquire any thing by an
assignment from the contributor, as he had neither the immediate title to
the contributions nor any inchoate right of copyright in those editions. He
could not assign any thing, because he owned nothing in praesenti, as the
title to his contributions and the inchoate right of copyright for those
66
editions, had become vested in Mrs. Wheaton as proprietor of the book.
Having rescued the copyright by finding that Lawrence's authorship vested
magically in Catherine because he wished it to, the court went on to subject the
67
copyright to Lawrence's claim to be its equitable owner.
Three years later, painter Arthur Parton sued lithographer and publisher
Louis Prang for copyright infringement. Parton had painted a landscape and
sold the painting to a purchaser, who resold it to Prang. Prang made and
published a lithograph of the painting and registered the copyright in the name
of his firm. Parton argued that he had not conveyed the copyright to his work
by selling the painting because the statute required copyright assignments to be
made in writing before two witnesses. The court held that those provisions of
the law applied only to textual manuscripts, and that no written assignment was
required to transfer the copyright in an unpublished painting .68
66 Id. at 51. The sophisticated reader may be wondering why Lawrence's book was not a
work made for hire. The answer is that in 1869, courts had not yet invented the work made
for hire doctrine. Copyright proprietors other than the author therefore needed to
demonstrate that they had legitimately acquired ownership of the copyright. As should be
clear from the description of the cases, courts were eager to accept flimsy evidence of such

an assignment. The first cases recognizing employer ownership of employee's works
appeared at the turn of the twentieth century. See Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The
Origins of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 15 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 1 (2003).
67 Lawrence, 15 F. Cas. at 53-55:
As the proprietor of the book, Mrs. Wheaton, by virtue of that arrangement, became the
absolute owner of the notes as they were prepared, so far as respects the editions in
question; and she also acquired therewith the right to copyright the same for the
protection of the property; but she did not acquire thereby any right or title, legal or
equitable, to use the notes in a third edition of the annotated work, without the consent
of the complainant.
68 Parton v. Prang, 18 F. Cas. 1273, 1278 (C.C.D. Mass. 1872). The 1831 Act did not
mention paintings. Sections 7 and 9 of the 1831 Act expressly required that the assignment
of the copyright in a manuscript, print, cut, or engraving be signed in the presence of two
witnesses. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 7, 9, 4 Stat. 436, 438 (repealed 1870). The court
held that the word "manuscript" in Section 9 did not encompass a painting, and didn't
address whether the phrase "print, cut, or engraving" also excluded paintings. See Parton,
18 F. Cas. at 1275-77. As the court noted, the recent 1870 Copyright Revision Act (enacted
after the facts giving rise to this case) had expressly extended copyright to paintings and
required assignment of copyright in paintings to be signed in the presence of two witnesses.
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Beyond doubt, the right of first publication is vested in the author;
but he may sell and assign the entire property to another, and if he does so
his assignee takes the entire property, and it is a great mistake to suppose
that any act of congress, at the date of the sales of the picture in this case,
required that such an assignment should be in writing; and the pleadings
show that the sale and delivery in each case were absolute and
unconditional, and without any qualification, limitation, or restriction,
transferred from the complainant and
showing that the entire property was
69
became vested in the respondent.
Thus, the court concluded, an author transferred his copyright (or his
entitlement to secure copyright) in the unpublished painting simply by selling

Id. at 1276-77; see also Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1909).
The court noted that the fact that paintings were expressly added to the statute in 1870
supported its conclusion that the term "manuscript" in the 1831 Act didn't include them. It
nonetheless appeared to hold that paintings were entitled to copyright under the 1831 Act,
even though the language enumerating works subject to copyright was the same as the
language enumerating works requiring written assignments in the presence of two witnesses.
See Parton, 18 F. Cas. at 1278. Notwithstanding the 1870 amendment, later courts relied on
Parton v. Prang for the proposition that assignments of the copyright in a work of art need
not be in writing. See infra note 69.
69 Parton, 18 F. Cas. at 1278. A later court cited Parton v. Prang as authority for the
proposition that a commission of a work of art conclusively vests the copyright in the
commissioner unless the artist has expressly reserved copyright in writing. Dielman v.
White, 102 F. 892, 895 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900). In Dielman, the contract to create a mosaic for
the Library of Congress said nothing about copyright. The artist put a copyright notice in his
own name on the two dimensional drawing created as a model for the mosaic, and on the
mosaic itself. He then registered the copyright on his own behalf. Id. at 892-93. The court
held that notwithstanding the Library's acceptance of the mural bearing the artist's
copyright notice, the contract itself had transferred the reproduction right, and the notice and
registration therefore had no effect. Id. at 895. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
followed Dielman v. White in Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939),
a 1939 decision involving a mural painted in 1905 by Charles Y. Turner. The City of New
York commissioned the mural for a wall of the auditorium in the DeWitt Clinton High
School. The contract said nothing about copyright. Mr. Turner put a copyright notice in his
own name on the mural itself, and registered his copyright under the terms of the thenapplicable statute. The court held that, in the absence of any mention of copyright in the
contract and any evidence of the precise terms of the agreement, "we must infer that
whatever agent of the city negotiated with Turner did his duty and obtained for the city all
that its contract for the building required; in other words, that Turner's contract of
employment did not reserve the copyright." Id. at 29-31. If you've been reading with great
care, you may be wondering why the notice in the artists' names on Dielman's mosaic and
Turner's murals didn't void the copyrights. In American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207
U.S. 284 (1907), the Supreme Court had held that no copyright notice was required on an
original painting, as distinguished from copies of it. Id. at 295-96. In neither case, though,
did the court need to reach that question. Once it held that the artists had parted with their
copyrights and lacked standing to sue for infringement, the cases were over.
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the painting. The statutory requirement of a written assignment in the presence
of two witnesses didn't control.
When Eaton Drone published his influential copyright treatise in 1879, he
declared confidently that, "[w]hile there has been much discussion as to the
necessity of a writing in assigning statutory copyright, it has never been
disputed, and is well settled, that the literary property in an unpublished work
70
may be transferred by word of mouth.
The United States Supreme Court adopted similar reasoning in Callaghanv.
Myers.71 Law book publisher E.B. Myers & Chandler claimed to have
purchased the copyright in volumes 39 to 46 of the Illinois Reports, authored
by state-appointed court reporter Norman Freeman. Myers had registered the
copyright in his firm's name and printed that name in the copyright notice on
the page following the title page of each volume. 72 When it sued Callaghan for
publishing allegedly infringing reports of the same cases, Callaghan argued
that under the copyright statute, Myers could not be the proprietor of the
copyright unless Freeman had assigned it to him in writing. The Court
disagreed:
While, after the obtaining of a copyright, a written assignment may be
necessary to convey title to it, or a written license to give a right to
reproduce copies of the copyrighted book, we perceive no reason why
Myers or Myers & Chandler could not become the owners by parol
transfer of whatever right Mr. Freeman, prior to the taking of the
copyright, had to convey. While the work was in manuscript no written
transfer of such manuscript from Mr. Freeman was necessary, because the
copyright had not yet been taken .73
Courts were willing to find a parol transfer of an author's rights, whatever
they were, in an unpublished manuscript, notwithstanding the statute's
requirement of a written assignment to transfer copyright. 74 When that rule met
up with the requirement for strict compliance with statutory prerequisites, the
result was to encourage courts to find that authors had parted with their rights.
As the Supreme Court construed the copyright statute, deviation from the

70 EATON

S.

DRONE,

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY

IN INTELLECTUAL

PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNrrED STATES 104 (1879) (citing Parton, 18 F.
Cas. 1273).
71 128 U.S. 617 (1888).
72 See NORMAN L. FREEMAN,

39

REPORTS OF CASES AT LAW AND IN CHANCERY ARGUED

AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS ii (1868) (copyright notice on the
page following the title page).
73 Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 658.
74 E.g., id.; White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 139 F. 427, 429 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1905), aff'd, 147 F. 226 (2d Cir. 1906), affd, 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
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statutory notice provision was fatal to the copyright. 75 The statute conditioned
copyright protection on a notice's bearing the correct name and date. Without a
correct notice, there could be no copyright protection. Courts seeking to
preserve copyright protection had only to find some mechanism by which the
alleged copyright proprietor named in the notice and certificate of registration
had acquired ownership of the copyright.
III. INTERLUDE: ACROSS THE OCEAN

In 1886, European and Asian nations signed the original Berne Convention,
promising each other to extend copyright protection to works authored by
citizens of signatory countries. 76 The United States was not able to participate,
since its copyright law still limited protection to works authored by citizens
and residents of the United States. A variety of amendments proposed in
Congress in the nineteenth century designed to extend copyright to works by
foreign authors had failed. 77 Finally, in 1891, the United States enacted the
Chace Act, which enabled foreign works to receive copyright protection if they
complied with U.S. requirements for registration, notice, deposit, renewal, and
printing from type set in the United States. 78 Although the original text of the
Berne Convention had permitted signatories to condition protection of foreign
works on compliance with any copyright formalities imposed by a work's
country of origin,79 the domestic typesetting condition prevented the United
States from joining the treaty. 80 A revised text of the Berne Convention
adopted in 1908 prohibited all formal prerequisites for international copyright
protection. 8 1 United States law would not be even arguably Berne-compliant
until 1989.82

71 See Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123, 149-51 (1889); see also DeJonge & Co. v.
Breuker & Kessler Co., 235 U.S. 33, 36 (1914) (applying 1870 Act); Mifflin v. Dutton, 190
U.S. 265,266 (1903) (applying 1831 Act); Mifflin III, 190 U.S. 260,264 (1903) (same).
76 See Thorvald Solberg, The InternationalCopyright Union, 36 YALE LJ. 68, 84 (1926).
77 See generally Thorvald Solberg, International Copyright in Congress, 1837-1886, 11
LIBR. J. 250 (1886).
78 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 3, 26 Stat. 1106, 1107-08 (repealed 1909).
79 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 2, Sept. 9,
1886.
80 See Solberg, supranote 76, at 103-06.
81Revised Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 4,
Nov. 13, 1908, 1 L.N.T.S. 217.
82 There are compelling arguments that U.S. law is not yet Berne-compliant. See, e.g.,
ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVrrY 37-52 (2010); Jane C. Ginsburg &

Eve C. Subotnik, Speaking of Moral Rights: A Conversation, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ.
91 (2012); Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433, 442 (2008);
Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar "Gap," 2007 UTAH L. REV.
659.
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By repudiating formal preconditions to copyright, members of the Berne
Union necessarily constrained the presumptions and trade practices
surrounding copyright ownership and assignment. The absence of any record
of who owns the copyright in a work is a workable regime only when either the
copyright owner or a licensing agent empowered to represent her is easily
identified. In most Berne Union nations, the rejection of formalities supported
the recognition of a strong presumption that copyrights belong to works'
authors.83 Over the next century, some Berne members would develop
copyright markets in which authors, as a matter of custom, rarely assigned
their copyrights, or were legally restricted in doing so. 84 Some Berne nations
would adopt requirements that any transfer of copyright be recorded. 85 Others
would establish rights holders collecting societies and task them with the
responsibility to keep track of copyright ownership. 86 In the United States, the
work of identifying the rights holder was done by copyright notice, so those
mechanisms never became robust.
IV.

COPYRIGHT NOTICE AND PAROL TRANSFERS

In the United States, copyright notice continued to be essential, and courts
insisted that the person named in the notice be the true owner of the
copyright. 87 At the same time, courts were reluctant to find copyright forfeit.
This led them to uphold purported transfers of the copyright in unpublished
88
works from the works' authors to copyright claimants on thin evidence.
Where it was possible to do so, though, they often sought to recognize authors'
equitable claims to relief. In Lawrence v. Dana, upon finding a parol transfer
of copyright in an unpublished work to the person named in the notice, the

83

See, e.g.,

CODE DE LA PROPRIITf INTELLECTUELLE [INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY CODE]

arts. L111-1, LI 13-1 (Fr.); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 104(2)-(2)(a)

(UK).
84 See, e.g., CODE DE LA PROPRItT

INTELLECTUELLE [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE]

arts. L131-4 (1994) (Fr.); ALEXANDER R. KLETT, MATTHIAS SONNTAG & STEPHAN WILSKE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN GERMANY:

PROTECTION, ENFORCEMENT

DISPUTE RESOLUTION 61 (2008).
85 E.g., Chosakuken HO [Copyright

48

Act],

No.

of

1970,

art.

77

AND

(Japan),

http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp [https://perma.cc/G9N7-CXT8] (Japan).
86 See, e.g., CODE DE LA PROPRItTI

INTELLECTUELLE [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE]

arts. L132-2-1, L133-2 (Fr.); Intellectual Property Act art. 147-159 (B.O.E. 1996, 97)

(Spain); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, §§ 116-123 (UK).
87 E.g., Osgood v. A.S. Aloe Instrument Co., 83 F. 470,470-72 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1897).
88 E.g., Belford v. Scribner, 144 U.S. 488, 504 (1892); Houghton Mifflin v. Stackpole

Sons, Inc., 104 F.2d 306, 310-11 (2d Cir. 1939); Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien,
Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161-62 (2d Cir. 1927); Grant v. Kellogg Co., 58 F. Supp. 48, 50-52
(S.D.N.Y. 1944).
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court recognized conditions requiring the copyright owner to secure the
89
authors' permission or pay compensation.
90
In Belford v. Scribner, the publisher of Common Sense in the Household:
A Manual of Practical Housewifery sued to enjoin the publication of an
allegedly infringing cookbook. Defendants argued that the publisher could not
be the owner of the copyright because the author was a married woman, unable
under the law to dispose of her own personal property, and her husband had
not assigned the copyright to his wife's books in writing. Agreeing with the
lower court that "if there is any ownership in this work by copyright at all, it is
in the [publisher], in whose name the copyright was taken and now stands," the
Supreme Court concluded that the husband's acquiescence in the publisher's
claim to own the copyright justified the inference that "legal title ... was in
some due and proper manner conveyed to and vested in the persons who
secured the copyright thereof.'"91
In the late nineteenth century, as publishers increasingly assumed the rights
of copyright proprietors, even the lax presumptions of copyright transfer did
not always suffice. In some cases, written documents undermined an assertion
that copyright was transferred implicitly. 92 In others, claimants introduced no
evidence of how they became the alleged proprietors of copyrights in the
works they published. 93 Without some evidence of facts to support a transfer,
some courts held that the alleged proprietor's claim of copyright ownership
was void. 94 Others, though, relied on bare surmise to support their conclusion
that the proprietor had somehow gained ownership of the95 common law
copyright and the right to apply for federal statutory protection.
So far, the cases finding a parol transfer of common law copyright from
author to proprietor predicated that transfer on a supposed agreement between

89 Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 53-55 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869). Other courts devised
similar gambits. See, e.g., Maurel v. Smith, 271 F. 211, 214-15 (2d Cir. 1921); Dam v. Kirk
La Shelle Co., 175 F. 902, 905-07 (2d Cir. 1910); Fitch v. Young, 230 F. 743 (S.D.N.Y.
1916), affd mem., 239 F. 1021 (2d Cir. 1917).
90 144 U.S. 488 (1892).
91 Id. at 504.

92 E.g., Press Publ'g Co. v. Monroe, 73 F. 196, 198-99 (2d Cir. 1896); see also Pub.
Ledger Co. v. Post Printing & Publ'g Co., 294 F. 430, 432-33 (8th Cir. 1923) (construing
1909 Act); Pub. Ledger Co. v. N.Y. Times, 275 F. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (construing 1909
Act), aff'd per curiam, 279 F. 747 (2d Cir.1922).

93E.g., Yuengling v. Schile, 12 F. 97, 100-02 (C.C.S -D.N.Y. 1882).
94 E.g., id.; see also Kaplan v. Fox Film Corp., 19 F. Supp. 780, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1937)
(construing 1909 Act). That meant that the publication of copies with notice in the alleged
proprietors' name, if done with the permission of the author or true copyright proprietor,
would have caused the work to enter the public domain. See, e.g., Egner v. E.C. Schirmer
Music Co., 139 F.2d 398, 399-400 (1st Cir. 1943).
95E.g., Dielman v. White, 102 F. 892, 895 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900); see also Yardley v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1939).

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:717

the author and the person in whose name the the copyright was registered. 96 At
the turn of the twentieth century, though, courts began to issue decisions
finding that the copyright had vested in the employer, notwithstanding the
absence of any evidence of a parol transfer, based on the bare fact of
employment. 97 These early cases involved disputes between employers and
third parties who challenged the validity of the employer's copyright, rather
than between employers and author-employees. From these cases, courts
98
evolved what became the work for hire doctrine.
V.

NOTICE IN THE WRONG NAME

Thus, the state of United States law at the turn of the twentieth century was
that copyright protection required scrupulous compliance with the statute's
registration, deposit, and notice provisions, but that the statutory provision
requiring any copyright assignment to be in writing had no application to
works until after they were published. That combination encouraged courts to
conclude that if copyright protection subsisted, it must belong to the individual
named in the copyright notice. 99 A handful of recent cases had upheld
copyrights in the name of someone other than the author on the ground of
employment rather than express or implied-in-fact assignment, but those cases
were still few.
It's worth remarking that the three prerequisites to copyright ownershipregistration of the printed title page before publication, deposit of published
copies shortly following publication, and copyright notice printed on the title
96 See, e.g., Dielman, 102 F. at 895; Parton v. Prang, 18 F. Cas. 1273, 1278 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1872); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26,51 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
9' E.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248-49 (1903); Edward
Thompson Co. v. Am. Law Book Co., 119 F. 217, 219 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902); Colliery Eng'r
Co. v. United Correspondence Schs., 94 F. 152, 153 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899); see also Fisk,
supra note 66, at 59-62; Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors,
Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 248-54
(2008). Both Fiske and Bracha suggest that the work made for hire doctrine arose in part
because of the increasing appreciation of corporate personhood.
98 See Fisk, supra note 66, at 55-62. The rule that an employer could own the copyright
in its employees' works without either a written or parol assignment was a novelty and
copyright lawyers were divided about whether it made sense. In 1905, the Librarian of
Congress convened a meeting of copyright lawyers and businesses and groups interested in
copyright to discuss copyright reform. These discussions led to the introduction of copyright
revision bills and, ultimately, to the enactment of the 1909 Copyright Act. See 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT xiii-xv (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe

Goldman eds., 1976). In the early discussions, participants disagreed about the current state
of the law regarding employer ownership, about the wisdom of addressing it in a revision
bill, and about the nature of an appropriate rule. See id. pt. C at 41-45, 54-57, 64-69; 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT AcT 65, 142-48, 188, 207-08 (E. Fulton

Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976).
99 E.g., Dam v. Kirk La Shelle Co., 175 F. 902,906-07 (2d Cir. 1910).
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page-were all actions peculiarly within the competence of the publisher.
Unless the publisher had expressly agreed to secure copyright in the author's
name, one would expect the publisher to use its own name in copyright
registration and notice, whether or not an author had executed a formal
assignment. That would leave courts with the choice of holding the copyright
void, or ratifying the publisher's ownership.
A careful author might seek to ensure that copyright was registered in the
author's name by publishing copies of the work that included notice in the
author's name, and registering and depositing those copies. Both Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Sr. and Harriet Beecher Stowe tried precisely that gambit,
with disastrous results. 100 Both authors licensed the Atlantic Monthly to publish
their works in serial installments. The earlier installments were published
without any attention to copyright formalities. For the later chapters, though,
the Atlantic Monthly included a copyright notice in its own name and
registered the copyright in each monthly issue on its own behalf. Meanwhile,
Holmes and Stowe published the full novels as books, each with notice in the
author's name, and registered their copyrights in the books. The Supreme
Court concluded that their efforts were unavailing. The publication of the
initial chapters of both books without copyright registration, deposit, or notice
had abandoned those chapters to the public domain.' The later chapters had
been published both with a notice in the name of the magazine and with a
notice in the name of the authors; both the magazine and the authors had
registered the copyrights. Those facts made it impossible to tell a plausible
story about the authors' intent to convey their copyrights to the initial publisher
and registrant, since their registration of their copyrights in their own names
were inconsistent with any such intent. 10 2 The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that there could be no double copyrighting. 0 3 That led inexorably
to the conclusion that if the authors retained their copyrights, the initial
magazine publication of the chapters with notice in the magazine's name
forfeited the copyright. If the authors had assigned their copyrights to the
Atlantic Monthly, on the other hand, the notice on the magazine would have
been proper, but the subsequent publication of their novels with notice in the
authors' names forfeited the copyright. 10 4 The Supreme Court affirmed:
11 Mifflin v. Dutton, 190 U.S. 265,266 (1903); Mifflin II1, 190 U.S. 260,264 (1903).
101Mifflin III, 190 U.S. at 261; Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 87-90 (1899).
102 Mifflin IIl, 190 U.S. at 262-63.
103 Mifflin v. R.H. White Co. (Mifflin 11), 112 F. 1004, 1005 (1st Cir. 1902), aff'd, 190
U.S. 260; accordCaliga v. Inter-Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182,189 (1909) ("There is
absolutely no provision in the statutes for a second filing of the photograph or description,
nor is there any provision as to filing any amendments thereto, and as the matter is wholly
the subject of statutory regulation, we are at a loss to perceive by what authority any second
application for the same painting, with a view to securing a copyright thereon, can be
sustained.").
104 See Mifflin II, 112 F. at 1005-06. The trial court put it this way:
The law seems to be settled that the name of the party taking out the copyright must be
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It is exceedingly unfortunate that, with the pains taken by the authors of
these works to protect themselves against republication, they should have
failed in accomplishing their object; but the right being purely statutory,
we see no escape from the conclusion that, unless the substance as well as
the form of the statute be disregarded, the right has been lost in both of
these cases. 105
Focusing on litigated failures to comply with statutory formalities can leave
a false impression. While evidence suggests that large numbers of copyright
registrations failed to comply with statutory prerequisites, and would have
been ruled invalid if their validity were litigated, 10 6 in most cases, copyright
validity was not litigated. The majority of copyright registrations with latent
1
technical defects appear to have worked well enough for their proprietors. 07
Even Harriet Beecher Stowe's copyright in The Minister's Wooing and Oliver
Wendell Holmes's copyright in The Professor at the Breakfast Table enabled
the authors and publishers to profit from the novels for more than forty years,
from their initial publication in 1859 until the courts ruled the copyrights to be
invalid in 1901. Similarly, the Warner Music Group, for many years the
claimant to a copyright in the song Happy Birthday to You, collected more than
two million dollars annually from licensing the song, despite multiple defects
in any claim that the copyright was valid. 10 8 In addition to the issues that
persuaded a federal district court to rule in 2015 that Warner had failed to

inserted in the notice of every edition published, and that the failure to do this vitiates
the copyright. A literal compliance with the statute may not be required, but the notice
must contain the essentials of the name, claim of exclusive right, and the date when
obtained. Under the authorities, I must hold that the insertion of the name "Ticknor &
Fields" in the copyright notice in the Atlantic Monthly for the months of November
and December, 1859, was an insufficient notice of Mrs. Stowe's copyright, and
invalidates her right to any copyright in that portion of her book.
Mifflin v. R.H. White Co. (Mifflin 1), 107 F. 708, 710 (C.C.D. Mass. 1901), aff'd, 112 F.
1004, aff'd, 190 U.S. 260. Because Stowe and Holmes had authorized the serialization of
their novels in the Atlantic Monthly, any notice defects in its publication of the chapters
inured to the authors' detriment.
'0' Dutton, 190 U.S. at 266. In the companion case, the Court noted that the magazine's
registration of its copyright under the title "Atlantic Monthly Magazine" would be
insufficient to secure a copyright in Holmes's novel, The Professor at the Breakfast Table.
See Mifflin III, 190 U.S. at 264:
With the utmost desire to give a construction to the statute most liberal to the author,
we find it impossible to say that the entry of a book under one title by the publishers
can validate the entry of another book of a different title by another person.
106 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Invention of Common Law Play Right, 25 BERKELEY
TECH. LJ. 1381, 1409 (2010).
107 See id. at 1409, 1425.
108 See generally Robert Brauneis, Copyright and the World's Most PopularSong, 56 J.
COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A.

335 (2009).
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prove that it had acquired title to the copyright, 10 9 there's compelling evidence
that the song was published without copyright notice in 1922.110 Under thencontrolling law, the song would have entered the public domain immediately.
VI. THE 1909 ACT

In 1909, Congress overhauled the copyright statute. Congress eliminated
registration and deposit as prerequisites to copyright protection."' The 1909
Act made copyright available, going forward, for works published with
copyright notice. 112 That change elevated the importance of notice in the
correct name. The statute, like its predecessors, specified both the form and
13
position of notice.'1
Congress added a provision excusing inadvertent mistakes in copyright
notices, 114 but courts construed that provision narrowly.' 15 Congress also
adopted the rule that the employer would be the legal author of works prepared
by employees, by defining "author" to "include an employer in the case of
works made for hire." 116 As with all previous copyright statutes, the 1909 Act
required that assignments or transfers of copyright be in writing117 Congress
added a provision emphasizing that ownership of a copyright was distinct from
the ownership of a material object embodying a work, and providing that the
transfer of the object "shall not of itself constitute a transfer of the

109 See Marya v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., No. 13-4460, 2015 WL 5568497, at *20
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2015).
110See Ben Sisario, An Old Songbook Could Put 'Happy Birthday' in the Public
Domain, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/05/business/media/
an-old-songbook-could-put-happy-birthday-in-the-public-domain.html
[https://perma.cc/
D4TR-Y7HS]; Daniel Victor, New Evidence Should Free 'Happy Birthday'from Copyright,
Lawyers Say, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/nyregion/
new-evidence-should-free-happy-birthday-from-copyright-lawyers-say.html
[https://
perma.cc/Z99Q-MZ3S].
nl E.g., Washingtonian Publ'g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 37-39 (1939); United Thrift
Plan, Inc. v. Nat'l Thrift Plan, Inc., 34 F.2d 300, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 1929).
12 See 1909 Act, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (repealed 1976). Some unpublished
works could for the first time acquire federal copyright protection through registration. Id.
§ 11.
113Id. §§ 18-19.
114 Id. § 20.
5 If the notice on more than a small number of copies failed to comply scrupulously
with the statutory requirements, courts held it ineffective. E.g., Advertisers Exch., Inc. v.
Anderson, 144 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1944); Deward & Rich, Inc. v. Bristol Sav. & Loan Corp.,
120 F.2d 537, 539-40 (4th Cir. 1941); Krafft v. Cohen, 117 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1941); Smith
v. Wilkinson, 19 F. Supp. 841, 842 (D.N.H. 1937).
116 1909Act § 62.
ld. § 42. The 1909 Act finally got rid of the long-inoperative language requiring
I7
authors to give permission to publish only in writing in the presence of two witnesses.
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copyright." 118 Nonetheless, the jurisprudence surrounding authors' parol
assignments of common law copyright in unpublished works continued to
control.1 19 Courts evolved a presumption: "Ownership of an unpublished
composition presumptively includes all the rights which the common law
recognized therein, among them being the privilege of publication and of
120
securing a statutory copyright."
Dam v. Kirk La Shelle Co.121 involved the copyright to Henry Dam's short
story, The Transmogrificationof Dan. Dam had submitted the story to Smart
Set magazine, which accepted the story and sent Dam a check for $85. Smart
Set published the story in the September 1901 issue of the magazine with a
copyright notice in the publisher's name; it promptly registered the copyright
in the entire issue. Dam later sued theatrical producer Kirk La Shelle for
copyright infringement alleging that Kirk La Shelle's production of Paul
Armstrong's The Heir to the Hoorah22 infringed the copyright in Dam's short
story. Dam insisted that he had never transferred the copyright to Smart Set,
but merely licensed it to publish the story in its magazine. 123 The court noted
that if Dam were right about that, under the Supreme Court's construction of
the notice requirement, the story's publication with notice in the magazine
publisher's name rather than Dam's would have caused the story to enter the
public domain. 124 The court concluded that Dam had transferred the entire

118 Id. § 41.
119

E.g., Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 104 F.2d 306,311 (2d Cir. 1939);

Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1927); Grant v.
Kellogg Co., 58 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
120 Gerlach-BarklowCo., 23 F.2d at 161 (citing Parton v. Prang, 18 F. Cas. 1273 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1872); DRONE, supra note 70).
121 175 F. 902 (2d Cir. 1910).
122 The Heir to the Hoorah opened at Broadway's Hudson Theatre on April 10, 1905,
and closed on May 29 after 59 performances. See The Heir to the Hoorah, IBDB,
http://www.ibdb.com/production.php?id=6081 [https://perma.cc/BMG3-FFCV]. The script
was later adapted as a silent film, directed by Cecil B. DeMille's older brother William
IMDB,
the
Hoorah (1916),
Heir
to
The
See
de Mille.
Churchill
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0006777/ [https://perma.cc/TF45-UDS4].
123 Dam, 175 F. at 904.
124 Id. at 905-06:

[W]e think that had Dam retained the dramatic rights to his story the entry of the
magazine and the notice of copyright would have been insufficient to protect them. A
notice of the copyright of the Smart Set magazine by the Ess Ess Publishing Company
is hardly equivalent to a notice that the story "The Transmogrification of Dan" is
copyrighted by or in favor of H. J.W. Dam....
But this question need not now be determined. Having found that the Ess Ess
Publishing Company became the proprietor of the story within the meaning of the
copyright statute, the precise question is whether that corporation took sufficient and
proper steps to protect the dramatic rights which belonged to it as assignee.
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copyright in his unpublished story to Smart Set, and that the publisher's notice
125
and registration in its name therefore preserved the copyright.
VII. THE ENDURANCE OF THE PAROL TRANSFER PRESUMPTION

Because a copyright, if it were valid, was necessarily owned by the person
or entity named in the notice, there was no need to develop conventions or
presumptions for identifying the copyright owner, and no need to require that
copyright assignments be recorded. Unless the copyright owner were the
person or entity named in the notice, the copyright was invalid. In response,
courts evolved unprincipled and unpredictable doctrines to justify, whenever
possible, holding that the title to the copyright was effectively assigned to the
person or entity named in the notice. Where undocumented parol transfers
could not be inferred, or would not support the right claimed, courts applied an
increasingly broad interpretation of the works made for hire doctrine. 126 By
1955, the Copyright Office estimated that forty percent of new applications for
127
copyright registration were for works made for hire.
The presumption that an author transferred his copyright whenever he
128
submitted a copy of the work for publication persisted under the 1909 Act.
The presumption may originally have arisen to prevent the forfeiture of
copyright from defects in notice, but later courts applied it as a freestanding
legal rule in the absence of any notice defects. Where the author claimed to
have reserved any rights in his copyright, courts were unsympathetic unless the
125 Dam had persuaded the magazine publisher to reassign to him whatever interest it had
in the copyright to his story; that enabled his widow to recover from Kirk La Shelle for its
production of an infringing play. See id. at 907.
126 E.g., Brattleboro Publ'g Co. v. Windmill Publ'g Co., 369 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir.
1966); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 123 F.2d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 1941). Designating a
work as made for hire was significantly worse for authors than holding that they had
assigned their copyrights before publication. Sections 23 and 24 of the 1909 Act vested the
copyright renewal in the author or author's surviving family. 1909 Act, ch. 320, §§ 23-24,
35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81 (repealed 1976). Courts construed the Act to allow authors who
assigned their common law copyrights before publication to apply for the renewal term. See
BARBARA A. RINGER, STUDY No. 31: RENEwAL OF COPYRIGHT, in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON

29-3 1, at 105, 12527 (Comm. Print 1961); see, e.g., Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d
737, 747 (2d Cir. 1975); White-Smith Publ'g Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247, 251-53 (1st Cir.
1911). If works were created by employees as works made for hire, though, the employer
was the author and entitled to apply for renewal. See, e.g., Tobani v. Carl Fischer, Inc., 98
F.2d 57, 59-60 (2d Cir. 1938).
THE JuDIcIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES Nos.

127 See BORGE VARMER, STUDY No. 13: WORKS MADE FOR HIRE AND ON COMMISSION, in
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES

Nos. 11-13, at 139 (Comm. Print. 1960).
128 E.g., Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 104 F.2d 306, 311 (2d Cir. 1939);
Freudenthal v. Hebrew Publ'g Co., 44 F. Supp. 754,755 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Pushman v. N.Y.
Graphic Soc., Inc., 25 N.Y.S.2d 32, 34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941).

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:717

author could produce written documentation that he retained the copyright or
30
any part of it. 129 Unsurprisingly, the rule worked to authors' disadvantage.
VII. COPYRIGHT WITHOUT NOTICE

The repudiation of copyright notice began with the enactment of the
1976 Copyright Act. Without repealing notice, registration, and deposit
requirements, Congress made most errors in copyright notice harmless. 131 At
the same time, Congress endorsed an expansive version of copyright
divisibility under which any subpart of any copyright exclusive right could be
separately assigned and owned. 132 Going forward, it was no longer necessary
that a copyright be owned by a person named in the copyright notice, or by
anyone in particular. Congress moderated the chaos-inducing aspects of these
changes by tweaking the copyright ownership rules. By vesting copyright in
authors as of the work's fixation, Congress eliminated the parol transfer of
common law copyright, and made the requirement of a written copyright
assignment applicable to unpublished works as well as published ones. As
soon as a work was initially fixed in tangible form, copyright vested in the
author. 33 Thereafter, ownership could be transferred only by a signed, written
instrument. 134 By enacting a detailed definition of works made for hire,
Congress sought to introduce some clarity and predictability to the
determination whether a work was owned by its creator or the person or entity
who financed its creation. 35 It didn't appear to occur to anyone contemplating
these changes that it might be necessary to retrofit some of our ownership,
assignment, and licensing rules to make it easier to ascertain who had authority
to license particular copyright uses.
In 1989, we abandoned notice requirements completely. Again, nobody
suggested that Congress might need to think about new provisions that might
replace some of the work that we had relied on copyright notice to accomplish.

129

See, e.g., Manners v. Morosco, 252 U.S. 317, 326-27 (1920); Maurel v. Smith, 271 F.

211, 214-15 (2d Cir. 1921); Grant v. Kellogg Co., 58 F. Supp. 48, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1944);
Pushman, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 32.
130 E.g., Grant, 58 F. Supp. at 52 ("When plaintiff furnished his art work to the defendant
for publication, he lost whatever common-law rights to copy he possessed."); see also
Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1939) (holding that where
contract for mural is silent as to copyright, court must presume that artist transferred rather
than reserved it).
131 1976 Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 404-406, 90 Stat. 2541, 2577-79 (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2012)).
132 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2).
133 Congress retained the rule that the "author" of a copyrighted work includes the
employer in works made for hire. Id. § 201(b).
134 Id. § 204. The statute also permits transfer "by operation of law."
135 See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL
L. REv. 857, 888-93 (1987).
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Now that copyright vests upon fixation, one might think that all of the
precedent surrounding assignment and transfer of common law copyrights
would be irrelevant. In fact, those doctrines have proved disturbingly longlived. First, of course, they control determinations of initial copyright
ownership in works first published or registered before January 1, 1978. In
twenty-first century cases involving twentieth century copyrights, the old
incoherent analyses still control, and cases commonly reach irreconcilable
results on identical facts. 136 Meanwhile, those analyses have slopped over to
confuse courts seeking to determine who owns the copyright in more recent
works.1 37 Publishers continue to presume that they own the copyrights in the
works that they publish whether or not the author has executed and signed a
1 38
transfer of copyright ownership.
136 See, e.g., Keiler v. Harlequin Enters., 751 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2014); Marvel Characters,
Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2013); Gary Friedrich Enters. v. Marvel Characters,
Inc., 716 F.3d 302 (2d Cir. 2013); Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, 616 F.3d 904 (9th Cir.
2010); Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002); HarperCollins
Publishers LLC v. Open Road Integrated Media, LLC, 7 F. Supp. 3d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2014);
Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 620-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2001),
affd, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002).
137 See, e.g., Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F. 2d 548, 552 (2d Cir. 1984);
Blum v. Kline, No. 86 Civ. 8149, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4424 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 1988);
Sasnett v. Convergent Media Sys., No. 95-12262, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17960 (D. Mass.
Aug. 29, 1977); see also 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 260 (2d Cir. 2015)
(holding that copyright in raw film footage created by a film director who was not an
employee and had not signed a work for hire agreement was owned by the film producer as
author because the producer had "initiated the project; acquired the rights to the screenplay;
selected the cast, crew and director; controlled the production schedule; and coordinated (or
attempted to coordinate) the film's publicity and release"). 16 Casa Duse doesn't cite any of
the older cases I've been discussing in this article. It relies, instead, on recent cases deciding
whether two contributors to a copyrighted work should be deemed joint authors. The court
resolves that question in the negative, and then concludes that Merkin's contribution, which
is indisputably not a work made for hire and was not assigned in writing, must belong to
Casa Duse anyway. How? A little magic; a little sleight of hand. See 16 Casa Duse, 791
F.3d at 256-61; cf. Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869). Arguably, the
joint authorship cases reflect the values of the parol transfer jurisprudence, in the sense that
they show an unseemly and sometimes unreasoning eagerness to move the ownership of
copyrights into the hands of the works' exploiters, but the joint work cases don't expressly
rely on any of the nineteenth or early twentieth century precedents that I've focused on in
this article.
138 One of my favorite examples involves the American Society of Composers, Authors,
and Publishers ("ASCAP"), who should surely know better. From 1938 to 2010, ASCAP
sponsored the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition, designed to encourage scholarship
about copyright law by awarding cash prizes for law student essays. See Foreword, 1
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 5, 5 (1939). A number of prominent copyright scholars
wrote their first copyright paper as entries in the Burkan Competition. See, e.g., Paul
Goldstein, Copyrighting the New Music, 16 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1 (1968); Robert
A. Gorman, Copyright for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 12 COPYRIGHT L.
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Scholars and prospective licensees complain that it has become impossible
to ascertain the identity of the owner of the rights one seeks to license. 139 We
read ubiquitous stories of false 1'4 or conflicting1 41 ownership claims, only a
tiny fraction of which land in court. 142 Purported copyright owners have

SYMP. (ASCAP) 30 (1963); Melville B. Nimmer, Inroads on Copyright Protection, 4
COPYRIGHT L. SYMPOSIUM (ASCAP) 2 (1952). In 1990, 14 years after the enactment of the

1976 Copyright Act, ASCAP adopted the following rule governing submissions to the
contest: "7(d). All papers submitted to the competition are deemed to be the property of the
Society and the Society shall be copyright owner of the works." See Papersfor 1990: Rules
Governing the Competition, 40 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) xxi, xxii (1997). This is
especially curious given that rule 7(b) permitted submissions that had been or would be
published in law reviews, so long as the papers' entry in the Competition was "duly noted."
Id. Presumably, the law reviews might also have believed that they owned the copyright in
the papers they published and might even have asked the students to execute written
copyright assignments.
139 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22
U. DAYTON L. REV. 547, 570-74 (1997); Litman, supra note 14, at 21-22; Molly Shaffer
Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549
(2010); see also Andy Baio, Criminal Creativity: Untangling Cover Song Licensing on
YouTube, WIRED (May 2, 2012, 3:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/05/opinion-baiocriminal-creativity/ [https://perma.cc/EW22-KF9V] (reporting that YouTube has licensed
sync rights from thousands of music publishers to permit the uploading of cover version of
their songs, but "[flrustratingly, we have no idea which publishers have signed on").
140See, e.g., Tim Cushing, YouTube's ContentlD Trolls: Claim Copyright on Lots of
Gameplay Videos, Hope No One Complains, Collect Free Money, TECHDIRT (Feb. 28,
2013, 10:56 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130227/20563322144/ youtubescontentid-trolls-claim-copyright-lots-gameplay-videos-hope-no-one-compains-collect-freemoney.shtml [https://perma.cc/9R44-HWFZ]; Ben Jones, MegaUpload, Universal, and the
DMCA-less

Mega

Song

Takedown,

TORRENTFREAK

(Dec.

16,

2011),

https://torrentfreak.com/megaupload-youtube-and-the-dmca-less-mega-song-takedown111216/ [https://perma.cc/BD3B-3SLL]; David Kravets, Rogues Falsely Claim Copyright
on YouTube Videos to Hijack Ad Dollars, WIRED (Nov. 21, 2011, 6:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/2011/1 1/youtube-filter-profiting/ [https://perma.cc/HZD2-UEAF].
141See, e.g., Eriq Gardner, Nina Simone's Heirs Allege Sony Music Operates a Piracy
Ring,

HOLLYWOOD

REP.

(May

21,

2015,

10:57

AM),

http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/nina-simones-heirs-allege-sony-797376
[https://perma.cc/UQ4N-8U3X]; Eriq Gardner, In Big Ruling, Sony Beats "Iron Man"
PM),
21,
2015, 12:07
REP.
(Apr.
Composer's Lawsuit, HOLLYWOOD
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/big-ruling-sony-beats-iron-790466
[https://perma.cc/7B2L-XTXD]; Martha Neil, Composer's Heirs Sue CBS over Use of
Iconic "Hawaii Five-0" Theme Music in TV Show Remake, ABA J. (Mar. 20, 2015, 1:10
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/composers-heirs-sue cbs over use of_
PM),
iconichawaii five o thememusicjin mod [https://perma.cc/QU8D-XWSF].
142 See 16 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 253; Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 737 (9th
Cir. 2015); Severe Records, LLC v. Rich, 658 F.3d 571, 573 (6th Cir. 2011); Brownstein v.
Lindsay, No. 10-1581, 2012 U.S. Dist LEXIS 170338 (D.NJ. Nov. 30, 2012), rev'd, 742
F.3d 55 (3d Cir. 2014); Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1088
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asserted that they cannot reliably identify all the works whose copyrights they
own. 143 Who owns the right to license a particular use turns out to require close
reading of the individual documents in the copyright chain of title-none of
which are publicly available. 144 In the United States, we never developed a
legal presumption or custom that authors retain their copyrights; we have no
requirement that transfers of copyright ownership be recorded in some public
registry; and for most works of authorship, we lack a robust system of
collecting societies tasked with the job of tracking down rights-holders and
collecting and remitting license fees for their works. 145 We face a legal milieu
in which the only users of preexisting copyrighted works who can do business
with confidence are the entertainment and information behemoths large enough
that they can afford to self-insure.
What's to be done? One partial response that would probably do the least
violence to the current structure of the U.S. copyright marketplace would be
Professor Jane Ginsburg's suggestion to adopt and enforce a requirement that
transfers of copyright ownership be recorded and the records maintained in a

(C.D. Cal. 2011); Complaint at 1-2, Megaupload Ltd. v. Universal Music Grp., Inc., No. C11-6216 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2011).
141 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 925 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
("[D]espite their claim that it would be burdensome or even impossible to identify all of the
copyrighted music they own, plaintiffs have made at least a minimal effort to describe the
works in suit.").
144 Who, for example, owns the copyright in this article? I know the answer, because I
have read (or, by the time you read this, will have read) both my university's copyright
policy and the publication agreement that this journal persuaded me to sign. You have no
way to figure it out, except to ask me, and my university, and the journal, and hope that we
all give you the same answer. That's a trivial problem with a work, like this one, that has
negligible economic value, but the same problems obtain for works with great commercial
significance. See, e.g., Keler v. Harlequin Enters., 751 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2014); Random
House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books, LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), affd, 283 F.3d
490 (2d Cir. 2002). The fact that copyright owners may assign different exclusive rights to
different exploiters in any combination exacerbates the problem significantly.
145 In the United States, collecting societies license some uses of some works. There are
well-established collecting societies that license public performance of music and digital
public performance of sound recordings. See U. S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT AND THE
MUSIC MARKETPLACE: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 32-52 (2015). The
Copyright Clearance Center has for decades sought to perform a similar service for copying
and distribution of published texts, with limited success. See Cambridge Univ. Press v.
Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2014). Collecting societies have historically had
an uneasy relationship with U.S. antitrust law, see, e.g., John M. Kernochan, Music
Performing Rights Organizationsin the United States of America: Special Characteristics,
Restraints, and Public Attitudes, 10 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 333 (1986), and are controversial
among both copyright owners and prospective licensees. See generally Jonathan Band,
Cautionary Tales About Collective Rights Organizations (Sept. 19, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=2149036 [https://perma.cc/
T25J-4HNX].
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publicly accessible format. 146 An easy-to-consult recordation database would
largely duplicate the owner-identification function of copyright notice; that
would partly ameliorate the inconsistency and unpredictability of copyright
ownership under U.S. law-at least for prospective licensees. Whether authors
would have better luck retaining their rights if their purported assignees needed
to publicly declare their ownership claims is much harder to predict, but
perhaps in the United States, that's no longer something we care about.

146 See Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 1611-21. Professor Ginsburg suggests that unrecorded
transfers would be treated as nonexclusive licenses. Id. at 1617. I would anticipate that
Ginsburg's proposal would generate strong opposition among large copyright owners. The
current uncertainties surrounding ownership, described in supra notes 139-44 and
accompanying text, mean that many large copyright owners are less than confident about the
clarity of their title to copyrights in the portfolio and unsure about copyrights they may or
may not own. From their vantage point, it makes more sense to maintain the status quo and
research the title of copyrights to works only when they decide they want to use them, rather
than to risk losing enforceable rights in some work they haven't yet decided to exploit.
Similar issues seem to be fueling opposition to meaningful orphan works legislation.

